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Abstract. Similarity measures are used extensively in machine learning and data science algorithms. The
newly proposed graph Relative Hausdorff (RH) distance is a lightweight yet nuanced similarity measure for
quantifying the closeness of two graphs. In this work we study the effectiveness of RH distance as a tool
for detecting anomalies in time-evolving graph sequences. We apply RH to cyber data with given red team
events, as well to synthetically generated sequences of graphs with planted attacks. In our experiments,
the performance of RH distance is at times comparable, and sometimes superior, to graph edit distance
in detecting anomalous phenomena. Our results suggest that in appropriate contexts, RH distance has
advantages over more computationally intensive similarity measures.
1. Introduction
Similarity measures play a crucial role in many machine learning and data science algorithms such as
image classification and segmentation, community detection, and recommender systems. A good deal of
effort has gone into developing similarity measures for graphs, in particular, since they often provide a
natural framework for representing unstructured data that accompanies many real-world applications. Some
popular graph similarity measures currently used are graph edit distance [42], iterative vertex-neighborhood
identification [9, 33], and maximum common subgraph based distance [18]. However, as graph datasets grow
larger and more complex, the need for tools that can both capture meaningful differences and scale well is
becoming more critical. In this respect, a number of sophisticated yet costly graph similarity measures, such
as those listed above, fall short.
The recently proposed graph Relative Hausdorff (RH) distance [45] is a promising measure for quantifying
similarity between graphs via their degree distributions. Inspired by the Hausdorff metric from topology
[25], RH distance was devised to capture degree distribution closeness at all scales, and hence is well-suited
for comparing the heavy-tailed degree distributions frequently exhibited by real-world graphs. Furthermore,
as recent work has shown [5], RH distance is extremely lightweight, with time complexity linear in the
maximum degrees of the graphs being compared. However, as this metric is relatively new, it has not
yet been extensively vetted. In particular, current research has not addressed its potential as an anomaly
detection method for time-evolving graphs.
In this work, we conduct a statistical and experimental study of RH distance in the context of dynamic
graphs. While RH distance may be applied to arbitrary pairs of networks, we focus our attention on sequences
of time-evolving networks arising from cyber-security applications. We begin by first applying RH distance
to cyber-security logs recently released by Los Alamos National Laboratory, and investigate the extent to
which it detects identified “red team” events. Then we follow up by studying RH distance in the more general
and controlled context of random dynamic graph models. Here we generate sequences of correlated Chung-
Lu random graphs using a simplified cyber-security model proposed by Hagberg, Lemons, and Mishra [24],
and test the extent to which RH distance detects several planted attack profiles. Throughout our analysis,
we compare the performance of RH to that of more well-known graph similarity measures, such as edit
distance and Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance of degree distributions. With this work, we better clarify the
range of differences captured by RH, and also highlight its practical advantages and disadvantages over other
methods.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Graph similarity measures. Below we define the graph similarity measures we consider for anomaly
detection in time-evolving graphs. We begin with the graph Relative Hausdorff distance, the primary focus
of our study.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
04
93
6v
1 
 [c
s.D
M
]  
12
 Ju
n 2
01
9
Degree k
N
(k
)
1
Figure 1. An illustration of the RH equivalent of an -ball (in green) on one graph ccdh
(in blue) compared with another (in red) at different points.
2.1.1. Relative Hausdorff distance. Originally introduced by Simpson, Seshadhri, and McGregor [45], the
Relative Hausdorff (RH) distance between graphs is a numerical measure of closeness between their comple-
mentary cumulative degree histograms (ccdh). More precisely, the (discrete) ccdh of a graph G is defined as
(N(k))
∞
k=1, where N(k) denotes the number of vertices of degree at least k. This is related to the commonly
used degree distribution, which is defined as (n(k))∞k=1 where n(k) denotes the number of vertices with degree
exactly k. Note that the ccdh and degree distribution are equivalent in the sense that each can be uniquely
obtained from the other; nonetheless, for the purpose of this exposition, it is more convenient to work with
the ccdh. Slightly abusing notation, we write G(d) for a graph G to mean the value of the ccdh of G at d,
and let ∆(G) denote the maximum degree of G. With these definitions in hand, the (discrete) RH distance
between F and G is then defined as:
Definition 1 ((Discrete) Relative Hausdorff distance [45]). Let F,G be graphs. The discrete directional
Relative Hausdorff distance from F to G, denoted
−−→RH(F,G), is the minimum  such that
∀d ∈ {1, . . . ,∆(F )},∃d′ ∈ {1, . . . ,∆(G) + 1} such that |d− d′| ≤ d and |F (d)−G(d′)| ≤ F (d),
and RH(F,G) = max{−−→RH(F,G) ,−−→RH(G,F )} is the discrete Relative Hausdorff distance between F and G.
In this paper, we compute RH distance using smoothed ccdhs, in which successive points are connected
via line segments, as recommended by [37, 46]. Specifically, the authors define the smooth ccdh of a graph
G, G(d) : R≥1 → R≥0, as
G(d) =
{
# of vertices of degree at least d, d ∈ Z≥1
(d− bdc)G(bdc) + (dde − d)G(dde), d ∈ R≥1 \ Z.
In this case, the RH distance is defined much the same as before, except that the ccdh is piecewise linear.
An illustration of the RH equivalent of an -ball at points on a smooth ccdh is given in Figure 1 and the
precise definition of smooth RH distance is given below. Henceforth, we focus exclusively on smooth RH
distance so we will drop the qualifier.
Definition 2 ((Smooth) Relative Hausdorff distance [37, 46]). Let F,G be graphs. The smooth directional
Relative Hausdorff distance from F to G, denoted
−−→RH(F,G), is the minimum  such that
∀d ∈ {1, . . . ,∆(F )},∃d′ ∈ R≥1 such that |d− d′| ≤ d and |F (d)−G(d′)| ≤ F (d),
and RH(F,G) = max{−−→RH(F,G) ,−−→RH(G,F )} is the smooth Relative Hausdorff distance between F and G.
By definition, RH(F,G) =  means that for every degree k in the graph F , F (k) is within -fractional
error of G(k′) for some k′ within -fractional error of k. Hence, the RH measure is flexible in accommodating
some error in both vertex degree values as well as their respective counts, yet strict in requiring that every
point in F be -close to G (and vice versa).
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Despite being referenced as a “distance”, RH distance does not satisfy the triangle inequality and hence
is best viewed as a similarity measure rather than a bona-fide distance metric. However, to match existing
literature we will still use the term “RH distance.” As shown in [5], RH(F,G) is extremely lightweight, and
can be computed with run time O(∆(F ) + ∆(G)). Lastly, we note that while RH distance values exceeding
one have been considered indicative of a “large” dissimilarity between ccdhs, see [45], it was shown in [5]
that the RH distance between graphs can be as large as O(m) when comparing graphs on m and n vertices
with m ≥ n.
2.1.2. Other measures. While RH distance will be the focus of the present work, we also consider several
other graph similarity measures in order to provide relevant context for its performance. First, we consider
another comparable lightweight, ccdh-based measure called Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance. KS distance
is a widely-used statistical measure of similarity between distributions, and serves as the test statistic for the
two-sample KS hypothesis test [51]. In what follows, we will not only compute KS distance directly between
graph degree distributions, but also between distributions of graph similarity values, such as RH values. To
avoid confusion, below we define both KS distance as well as the two-sample KS hypothesis test (for which
KS distance is a test statistic) for general empirical distributions.
Definition 3 (KS distance and two-sample KS test). Let F ∈ Rn and G ∈ Rm be empirical cumulative
distribution functions. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov distance is
KS(F,G) = max
x
|F (x)−G(x)|.
The null hypothesis that F and G are samples of two identical probability density functions is rejected at the
α confidence level if
KS(F,G) > c(α)
√
n+m
nm
,
where c(α) =
√
− 12 logα. The value exp(− 2KS(F,G)
2nm
n+m ) is called the p-value of the two-sample KS test.
For clarity, we emphasize that smaller values of KS distance indicate greater similarity between distribu-
tions, whereas smaller p-values permit one to reject the null hypothesis of identical underlying distributions
at a higher confidence level, thereby presenting stronger evidence the empirical distributions were drawn
from different underlying distributions. For the special case that F and G are the ccdhs of two graphs on n
and m vertices, respectively, KS distance is given by KS(F,G) = maxx∈N |F˜ (x) − G˜(x)|, where F˜ = 1n · F
and G˜ = 1m ·G . As argued in [37, 46], KS distance between graph ccdhs can sometimes be large in graphs
that are intuitively similar; furthermore, KS distance may also be insensitive to certain important differences
between graph ccdhs, particularly in the tails of ccdhs (which correspond to high-degree vertices).
On the other end of the computational spectrum, we also consider graph edit distance (GED). Arguably
one of the most well-known graph similarity measures, GED has been widely used throughout machine
learning, particularly in computer vision and pattern recognition contexts [20]. An edit operation on a graph
consists of either an insertion, deletion, or substitution of a single vertex or edge.1 An edit path of length k
between F and G is a sequence of edit operations P = (e1, . . . , ek) that takes F to a graph that is isomorphic
to G. Edit distance is the total weight of the minimum-cost edit path, i.e.
Definition 4 (Graph edit distance). Let F,G be graphs. The graph edit distance between F and G, denoted
GED(F,G) is given by
GED(F,G) = min
P∈Υ(F,G)
∑
ei∈P
c(ei),
where Υ(F,G) denotes the set of possible edit paths from F to G, and c(ei) ≥ 0 denotes a cost-function
measuring the weight of edit operation ei.
In what follows, we simply take c(ei) = 1 for any edit operation, in which case GED(F,G) is the minimum
number of edit operations needed to transform F to G.
1While others sometimes including merging and splitting edit operations, we restrict our attention to edit distance based on
the three aforementioned operations.
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2.2. Related Literature. While in this work we focus on the graph Relative Hausdorff distance, we note
that a wide variety of graph similarity measures have been utilized for anomaly detection in time-evolving
graphs. In [28], the authors propose detecting anomalies in communication network traffic data by measuring
cosine similarity between the principal eigenvectors of graph adjacency matrices. In [3], Akoglu and Falout-
sos also take an eigenvector-based approach for measuring graph anomalousness. Matrix-analytic graph
similarity measures have also been based on eigenvalue residuals [22], non-negative matrix factorization [48],
and tensor decompositions [43]. Other popular approaches for graph-based anomaly detection are via dis-
tance metrics, such as those based on edit distance, maximum common subgraph distance, or mean vertex
eccentricity [21], or take a community-detection approach towards identifying anomalies by tracking changes
between clusters of well-connected vertices [2, 50]. For a broader survey of graph-based anomaly detection
techniques see [4, 41, 44] and the references contained therein. Lastly, we note that applications of graph
similarity functions extend far beyond anomaly detection. Graph similarity functions are also ubiquitous in
inexact graph matching and graph classification problems. For instance, graph edit distance is a key tool for
error-tolerant pattern recognition and computer vision techniques [20]. While in this work we explore Rela-
tive Hausdorff distance through the lens of anomaly detection, we note its application as a graph similarity
measure in other contexts such as these remains unexplored.
As our focus in this paper will be on cyber anomaly detection2 in network flow data, we also mention
some of the existing graph-based methods specifically for cyber anomaly detection. In this domain, some
researchers focus on detecting anomalies edge-by-edge or target specific types of behavior, e.g., [19, 39],
while others look at the graph more globally or structurally and are agnostic to the type of anomalous
behavior being detected, e.g., [12]. In [39] Noble and Adams describe a real-time unsupervised framework
for detecting anomalies in network data. They consider “edge activity” as the sequence of flows on a single
edge and compute correlations between event inter-arrival times and other edge data (e.g., byte count or
protocol). Statistically significant changes in those correlations are flagged as anomalies. Groups of adjacent
anomalies can be combined to form larger anomalies perhaps indicating coordinated behavior. The authors
of [19] use PageRank to perform linkage analysis followed by clustering techniques to identify groups of
IPs with similar behavior. These groups are then compared with known bot behavior to detect botnets
within the network. In the category of more structural and behavior-agnostic algorithms [12] introduces
multi-centrality graph PCA and multi-centrality graph dictionary learning which use structural properties
of a graph, e.g., walk statistics and centrality measures, to learn normal structure and thus detect abnormal
structure. This method is not tailored to the cyber use case, but the authors use network flow as one of their
examples. Our work is similarly not targeted towards a specific cyber use case and is focused on detecting
structural perturbations rather than clustering behavioral patterns.
3. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Cybersecurity Data
To begin our study of RH distance as an anomaly detection method for dynamic graphs, we will first
consider a dataset recently released by LANL with known red team events from their internal corporate
computer network [30, 31]. The dataset represents 58 consecutive days of de-identified event data collected
from four sources, namely:
• Windows-based authentication events from both individual computers and centralized active direc-
tory domain controller servers,
• Process start and stop events from individual Windows computers,
• Domain Name Service (DNS) lookups collected by internal DNS servers, and
• Network flow data collected at several key router locations.
In total, the data set is approximately 87.4 gigabytes, spread across the four modalities, including 1,648,275,307
events coming from 12,425 users, 17,684 computers, and 62,974 processes. Ground truth for the red team
events is given as a set of authentication events that are known red team compromise events. In this sec-
tion, we will demonstrate that Relative Hausdorff distance is effectively able to identify anomalous behavior
around the red team events in the LANL data.
2Note that we do not consider signature-based methods like those employed in intrusion detection/prevention systems (e.g.,
Snort) to be anomaly detection methods. Instead these are rule-based behavior identification tools.
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3.1. Data Source. As stated above, LANL captured network evolution in four different modalities, namely
authentication, process, network flow, and DNS events. In order to apply the RH distance, we first must
convert these network event files into a time series of graphs. To do so, we consider 60 second moving windows
that advance 20 seconds at a time. For each window we use the events in that window to construct a graph.
For the 58 consecutive days, this yields a time sequence of 250,560 graphs for each modality. Further details
for constructing each type of graph are given below.
• Authentication Graphs. The authentication data is a record of authentication events collected
from individual Windows-based desktop computers, servers, and Active Directory servers. Each line
of the data file reports a separate authentication event in the form
time, sourceUser@domain, destUser@domain, source computer, dest computer,
auth type, logon type, auth orientation, pass/fail.
For a given window, we construct an unweighted graph with edges {sourceUser, destUser} for each
user pair present in the logs within the window.
• Authentication Failure Graphs. These are constructed in the same manner as the Authentication
Graphs, except we restrict the edge set to those corresponding to failed authentications only.
• Process Graphs. The process data is a record of process start and stop events collected from
individual Windows-based desktop computers and servers. Each line of the data file reports a
separate process start/stop in the form
time, user@domain, computer, process name, start/end.
For a given window, we construct an unweighted graph with edges {computer, process name} for
each computer-process pair present in the logs within the window.
• DNS Graphs. The DNS data is a record of DNS lookup events collected from the central DNS
servers within the network. Each line of the data file reports a separate lookup event in the form
time, source computer, computer resolved,
representing a DNS lookup at the given time by the source computer for the resolved computer. For a
given window, we construct an unweighted graph with edges {source computer, computer resolved}
for each source-resolved computer pair present in the logs within the window.
• Flow Graphs. The flow data is a record of the network flow events collected from central routers
within the network. Each line of the data file reports a separate network flow event in the form
time, duration, source computer, source port, dest computer, dest port, protocol,
packet count, byte count.
For a given window, we construct an unweighted graph with edges {source computer, dest computer}
for each source-destination computer pair that communicate during that time.
3.2. Limitations. While working with real-world data often presents challenges, testing graph-based anom-
aly detection methods on the LANL dataset is particularly difficult for several reasons. First and foremost,
the data only provides red team authentication attempt time stamps and does not specify the nature, extent
or duration of the red team events. This makes it difficult to segregate benign from anomalous time periods.
Additionally, without knowing the specific red team actions, it is difficult to determine which (if any) of the
aforementioned modalities a red team signature may appear in. Finally, it is worth noting the data exhibited
large periods of time in which no events occurred that did not correspond to regular lulls such as weekends
and nighttime. In particular, the flow data has records from only the first 37 of the 58 days. To address
some of these limitations, in Section 4 we extend our analyses to a generalized dynamic network model [24]
proposed by LANL scientists Hagberg, Mishra, and Lemons. While no synthetic model is a perfect substitute
for real data, this model’s conception and design was directly informed by direct access to the LANL cyber
data [29, 32] and provides a framework under which we may draw more certain and rigorous conclusions
regarding the behavior of RH distance. First, we present our analysis of the real LANL data.
3.3. Experiment and results. As a first-pass approach towards studying the sensitivity of RH distances
to red team events in the LANL dataset, we test whether the distribution of pairwise RH distance values
before a red team event differs significantly from the post red team event distribution. In this way, we
assess whether there is statistical evidence to support that red team events demarcate “change-points” in
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Window: 30 min Window: 60 min Window: 120 min
Mode/Shift 20s 40s 60s 120s 240s 20s 40s 60s 120s 240s 20s 40s 60s 120s 240s
AuthFail 0.20 0.49 0.70 0.97 0.57 0.01 0.39 0.10 0.76 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Auth 0.36 0.72 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.01 0.63 0.06 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.07
Flow 0.61 0.30 0.31 0.76 0.91 0.75 0.49 0.17 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
DNS 0.40 0.02 0.41 0.77 0.12 0.97 0.36 0.60 0.86 0.16 0.59 0.55 0.13 0.34 0.04
Process 0.44 0.82 0.64 0.96 0.74 0.03 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.43 0.17 0.06 0.01
Table 1. The p-values of the two-sample KS test comparing RH distance distributions of
aggregated before and after periods of time windows centered at red team events in the
LANL data. The p-values are rounded to two decimal places, with rounded values at most
0.01 highlighted in green and values between 0.02 and 0.05 highlighted in yellow.
RH distance distribution. To that end, for each red team event at time r, we associate a time window w of
length ` centered at r, which we denote w`(r). Each such window can be naturally partitioned into a “before”
period (i.e. the time interval (r − /`2, r)) and “after” period, (r, r + /`2). To avoid overlapping windows and
ensure the “before” periods are in fact devoid of red team events, we restrict attentions to windows in which
no red team event occurs in the time interval (r − /`2, r). Put equivalently, we consider the set
W` = {w`(r) : red team event occurs at r, no red team events occur in (r − /`2, r)}.
We note that it is possible for the after period of a window in W` to contain additional red team events. For
each window in W`, we compute the RH distances between pairs of graphs separated by δ seconds in the
before period, as well as such pairs belonging to the after period. We then aggregate the RH distances over
all before periods and all after periods. More precisely, if G0, G1, . . . denotes the time-ordered sequence of
graphs for a particular mode in the LANL data, we compute the aggregate before and after distributions as
Db = {RH(Gt, Gt+δ) : t, t+ δ ∈ (r − /`2, r) and w`(r) ∈W`},
Da = {RH(Gt, Gt+δ) : t, t+ δ ∈ (r, r + /`2) and w`(r) ∈W`},
respectively. Recalling that we processed the LANL graph sequence for each modality by generating graphs
for windows shifted by 20 seconds, we may choose the parameter δ controlling the granularity of pairwise RH
measurements to be as small as 20 seconds and and as large as /`2− 20 seconds. Finally, we assess whether
these aggregated before and after RH distance distributions differ significantly by conducting a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Table 1 presents the resulting p-values for δ = 20, 40, 60, 120, 240 seconds, under
window lengths ` = 30, 60, 120 minutes, for each LANL modality.
The p-values in Table 1 suggest that whether the aggregated distribution of RH values before red team
events differs significantly from the post red team events depends crucially on the cyber modality, window
length and granularity parameter δ. In the case of a 30 minute window, almost none of the parameter settings
for any modality result in statistical significance, while for a 2-hour window, a majority of parameter settings
are significant at a level of 0.05. In this case, the before and after RH distance distributions over longer
time windows surrounding red team events more frequently show significant differences, which is perhaps
unsurprising. On the other hand, the changes in significance levels as the granularity parameter δ varies
are more difficult to interpret. Even for a fixed window length and modality, the significance levels neither
consistently increase nor decrease in δ.
One plausible hypothesis for this experiments sensitivity to δ is that RH distance values exhibit periodic
behavior both within and across modalities, reflecting the natural circadian rhythms one might expect
from temporal cyber data. If this were the case, the choice of δ may skew the RH values sampled when
constructing the representative before and after distributions. To check whether such periodicity is indeed
present in the RH distance measurements on LANL, we constructed heatmaps of RH distances between all
pairs of graphs over given time windows. As this requires a quadratic number of comparisons, it is worth
noting this analysis is crucially facilitated by the lightweight computational complexity of RH distance. We
examined heatmaps not only for windows surrounding anomalies, but also for time windows away from red
team events. Figure 2 (left column) presents sample heatmaps for the Authentication, Flow and Process
6
modalities spanning a 2-hour time period. In an effort to select a representative window for short-term
nominal RH behavior within each modality, this time period was selected so as to not include any red team
events nor be preceded or followed by any red team events for 20 hours. It is also worth pointing out that the
RH distance between pairs of flow graphs regularly exceeds one, indicating that the rough guide for detecting
anomalous behavior given in [45] is inappropriate for the cyber-security context. We also transformed each
heatmap of pairwise RH distance values into a similarity matrix by applying the Gaussian kernel with σ = 1,
and performed normalized Laplacian spectral clustering3, as described by Ng, Jordan and Weiss [38]. Under
the corresponding heatmap, Figure 2 (right column) plots the pairs of graphs belonging to common clusters,
using a different color for each cluster (and white for different clusters).
A cursory examination of the heatmaps and their clustering suggests that the RH distance values for a
given modality exhibit persistent and striking periodic patterns. Furthermore, in comparing the plots for
Flow, Authentication, and Process, the differences in the periodic behavior of RH values are also apparent.
While these periodicities are not entirely unexpected they are likely network- and data-dependent. Detecting
and visualizing periodic behavior in network data is an active area of research, e.g., [23, 27, 40]. As a
consequence of this experiment and examination of the heatmaps in Figure 2, it is clear that a single choice
of granularity parameter δ is likely insufficient in establishing a representative distribution of RH values
within a time window for any given modality. Accordingly, next we refine our experiment to better account
for the inherent multi-scale and multi-modal nature of the LANL data.
One of the many difficulties with investigating the effectiveness of RH distance in detecting anomalous
behavior associated with red team events in the LANL data sets is that the red team process is inherently
multi-modal and multi-scale. That is, the red team events identified in the data are simply the first step of the
red team intrusion process which could potentially affect all of the data modalities (process, DNS, flow, and
authentication) and occur over multiple time scales. To attempt to deal with this issue, we craft an indicator
for each time that considers the RH distance between graphs with multiple time differences and in multiple
modalities. More concretely, let S be the set of potential data sources and let G = {Gt,s} be the collection
of observed graphs indexed by the time t and data source s ∈ S. For any fixed timestamp t and collection of
differences D, we will define the profile vector at time t, v(t), as the vector given by (RH(Gt,s, Gt−δ,s))s∈S,δ∈D.
Ideally, this profile could be used to aggregate the behavior across multiple modalities and multiple time
scales and give a clearer picture of the overall state of system. However, there is a further complication with
this approach in that the LANL data represents a system which has a naturally evolving behavior based
on various temporal patterns of human activity (i.e. weekday vs. weeknight, circadian rhythms, etc.). To
adjust for these temporal patterns, for every time t, source s ∈ S, and difference δ ∈ D, we define a baseline
behavior random variable Bt,s,δ which is the random variable which represents the “typical” behavior of
RH(Gt,s, Gt−δ,s). This baseline behavior can then be combined with the profile vector v(t) to generate a
temporal profile vector vˆ(t) where for any (s, δ) ∈ S × D we have vˆ(t)s,δ = P
(
v
(t)
s,δ −  < Bt,s,δ < v(t)s,δ + 
)
. We
define the temporal score of the time t as the geometric mean of the entries of vˆ(t) 4. In what follows, we
will calculate the temporal scores of time periods before and after a red team authentication event and
show that there is a statistically significant difference between the behaviors. In fact, we will show that this
temporal scoring methodology is more sensitive than using raw RH scores evaluated in Figure 1 indicating
that there are significant potential gains to be found by considering multi-modal and multi-scale indicators
for anomalous behaviors.
Before applying our results to the LANL data sets, it remains to address how to estimate the distribution
of the random variable Bt,s,δ and how the  term defines the temporal profile vector is chosen. For a fixed
t we estimate the empirical distribution for Bt,s,δ, we consider the RH distance between all pairs of graphs
(Gt∗,s, Gt∗−δ,s) where t∗ ranges over all times that differ from t by a multiple of a week, plus or minus 10
minutes. In order to avoid biasing this empirical estimate we exclude times t∗ where there is a red team
event in the interval [t∗ − δ, t∗] as well as those that are within 10 minutes of t. As we see in Figure 2 the
typical variation of a RH distance changes significantly based on the modality of the observation, both in
source and elapsed time between graphs. Thus, rather than fixing a particular value of , we choose  as
3The prescribed number of clusters was chosen to coincide with the first observed gap in Laplacian eigenvalues, as in [49].
4As a practical matter, for those entries (t, s, δ) where there is insufficient or no data to estimate vˆ
(t)
s,δ, the entry is dropped
from the vector and ignored in the calculation of the temporal score.
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Figure 2. Left Column: RH distance heatmaps for nominal two-hour period.
Right Column: Spectral clustering of similar graphs based on RH distances.
one twentieth of the range of the empirical distribution for Bt,s,δ. Finally, for each of the 712 red team
times provided in the LANL data we calculate the temporal scores for each graph in the 30 minutes before
and after the red team time and apply the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, see Table 2. We further
segregate this data by whether or not additional red team events occur during the 30 minutes prior to the
red team time.
It is clear from Table 2 that the temporal scores is far from a perfect indicator, as a non-negligible fraction
of the changes associated with a red team event are not detected. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that for
a relatively lightweight measure the RH distance exhibits reasonable effectiveness in distinguishing between
nominal and anomalous behaviors. However, our conclusions must be somewhat tempered by the challenging
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p ≤ 0.10 p ≤ 0.05 p ≤ 0.01 Total
intervals with no prior red team events 30 30 21 48
intervals with prior red team events 478 460 370 664
Table 2. Aggregate behavior of temporal scoring on a per event basis
nature of real world data and the LANL data in particular. Specifically, the lack of clear demarkation between
anomalous and non-anomalous behavior as well as the limited time-scope of the investigation are significant
caveats to any conclusions we make about the effectiveness of RH distance. In following section, we attempt
to address these caveats by analyzing a synthetic temporal graph model inspired by the LANL cyber data.
4. Simulated Evolving Networks
The study of temporal networks is concerned with the analysis and modeling of time-ordered sequences of
graphs. In order to better understand temporal network dynamics, researchers have proposed a plethora of
abstract models for their simulation (for a survey, see [26]). In the present work, we consider a temporal graph
model that belongs to the broader class of Markovian Evolving Graphs (MEGs) [7]. Given a probability
distribution over the set of all graphs on a fixed vertex set, MEGs have the defining property that the
distribution at time t is completely determined by that at t − 1, thereby forming a sequence of random
variables which satisfy the Markov property. Because of their generality and flexibility, MEGs have been
popularly used to study information spreading processes, such as file sharing on peer-to-peer networks, social
network memes, and disease spreading [16, 17].
In [24], Hagberg, Lemons and Mishra proposed a new MEG model, the design of which was informed
by their study of LANL centralized authentication system cyber data [29, 32]. In particular, they observed
that these sequences of graphs exhibit certain stable global properties, such as skewed degree distributions,
while local dynamics such as individual vertex neighborhoods change rapidly. To capture these dynamics,
they designed a temporal model that can be used to preserve certain random graph structure while affording
tunable control over the rate of dynamics. We refer to their model as the HLM model. Ultimately, Hagberg
et. al utilized the HLM model to study temporal reachability; that is, the expected time (number of evolutions
or transitions) before a constant fraction of the vertices are reachable from an arbitrary vertex. We note
that although the HLM model was developed to capture abstract dynamics exhibited by cyber data, the
HLM model need not be limited to simulating cyber phenomena. Although, the experiment that follows is
driven by cyber-security structures and data, the is no a priori reason that a similar experiment could not be
applied across the variety of domains for which the evolving nature of the HLM model is appropriate, such
as communication networks, social networks, and (on a much slower time scale) transportation networks.
In the remainder of this section, we study the sensitivity of RH distance in detecting several planted attack
profiles, utilizing the HLM model to simulate the natural time evolution of a generic cyber network graph
topology. Before describing our experimental methodology, we first begin by defining and briefly discussing
the HLM model.
4.1. Hagberg-Lemons-Mishra (HLM) Model. As the HLM model can be viewed as a time-evolving
generalization of the Chung-Lu model G(w), we will first briefly review the Chung-Lu model as introduced
in [13, 14]. The parameterization vector of the Chung-Lu model, w, is n-dimensional where n is the number
of vertices in the graph. Additionally, the vector w satisfies that wv ≤ √ρ for all v where ρ =
∑n
i=1 wi.
From the parameter w the Chung-Lu model is generated by including each edge {u, v}, independently, with
probability wuwv/ρ. For overview of many of the known properties of the Chung-Lu model see the recent
monograph [15].
The HLM model generates an infinite sequence of graphs G0, G1, G2, . . . with the property that there is
a fixed vector w such that for all i, Gi
D
= G(w) where D= is equality in distribution. In order to generate this
sequence an additional parameter, α, is introduced to tune the extent to which graph Gi+1 is controlled by
Gi. Specifically, α ∈ [0, 1]n and Gi+1 is formed from Gi by generating a masking set M where each pair
{u, v} is in M independently with probability √αuαv. For an edge {u, v} 6∈ M , {u, v} ∈ Gi+1 if and only
if {u, v} ∈ Gi, while each potential edge {u, v} in M is present independently with probability wuwv/ρ. In
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summary, we have that
P({u, v} ∈ Gi+1) =
{
1−√αuαv +√αuαvwuwv/ρ {u, v} ∈ Gi√
αuαvwuwv/ρ {u, v} 6∈ Gi
.
The fact that Gi+1
D
= Gi follows by induction and the observation that
wuwv/ρ (1−√αuαv +√αuαvwuwv/ρ) + (1− wuwv/ρ)√αuαvwuwv/ρ = wuwv/ρ.
We note that there is a natural trivial generalization of the HLM model where the edge probability wuwv/ρ
is replaced with arbitrary values in puv ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, at each time step the network is distributed
over graphs like G(P ), the generic independent edge graph model with parameter P . Similarly, the evolution
parameter α can be generalized to a symmetric matrix A ∈ [0, 1]n×n. We note that several well studied
models fall into this framework, including the stochastic block model, stochastic Kronecker graphs [34, 36],
random dot product graphs [52, 53, 54], and the inhomogeneous random graph model [10, 47]. In order to
maintain consistent notation, we will specify all of the experiments in this work in terms of this generalized
HLM model even though most of generative matrices P come from the Chung-Lu model. Further, with
the aim of having the minimum number of free-parameters we will only consider HLM evolutions where
Auv = Axy for all u 6= v and x 6= y. We will further slightly abuse notation and refer to this common value
as α.
Finally, we note that this generalized framework can be further expanded by allowing the parameter
matrix P to depend on the time step t. In particular, we have
P({u, v} ∈ Gt+1 | Gt) =
{
(1− α) + αp(t+1)uv {u, v} ∈ Gt
αp(t+1) {u, v} /∈ Gt
.
It is worth mentioning that in this case Gt+1 is not distributed like G(P (t+1)) because of the possibility of
edges being present from earlier timesteps. In fact, it is an easy exercise to show that the edges of Gt are
distributed according to (1− α)tP (0) +∑ti=1 α(1− α)t−iP (i).
4.2. Experimental Setup. In our experimental setup, in keeping with the lightweight nature of the RH
calculation, we focus on the detection of small anomalies in extremely sparse graphs, such as we observed in
small time windows for the LANL data set and other proprietary network flow data. For the sparse graphs we
consider two different fixed degree distributions. Both of these degree distributions are formed by choosing
5000 samples from some fixed probability distribution. For the first degree distribution, we estimate a degree
density function using a smoothed median estimator from a selection of one minute graphs in the LANL
network flow data set, see Figure 3a. The resulting degree density function results in a “power-law” like
degree distribution with exponent approximately 3.5. Although the resulting degree density function is not
truly a power-law distribution, we will abuse notation and refer to it as a “power-law” degree distribution.
For a discussion of the difficulties and appropriateness of the power-law degree distribution for real data
the interested reader is referred to the recent work [11]. The resulting distribution has 4,742 edges in
expectation as well as maximum expected degree 961. The second distribution represents what we call a
“bump power-law,” that is, a power-law distribution coupled with an approximately binomially distributed
“bump” at higher degrees. This can be thought of as a more hub-and-spoke style network where the degree
of the spoke vertices are approximately power-law distributed while the degree of the hub vertices are
approximately binomially distributed. For the bump power-law distribution, the degree probabilities were
explicitly estimated from a collection of several thousand graphs generated from a proprietary enterprise
boundary network flow data set (see Figure 3b). This resulting distribution has 6,067 edges in expectation
as well as maximum expected degree 327.5
We will also consider two different styles of anomalies involving between 10 and 50 edges. The first
anomaly involves three randomly chosen vertices adding some number of edges to the rest of the network
uniformly at random. We view this as behavior consistent with a probe or scan of the network structure.
For the second anomaly a random collection of vertices are chosen and a random spanning tree is added
5It is worth mentioning that both of these degree distributions violate the standard assumption for the Chung-Lu model
maxv wv ≤ √ρ. To deal with this, we replace that edge probabilities of wuwv/ρ with min {1,wuwv/ρ}. However, as there are
under 200 pairs {u, v} where wuwv > ρ for each of the degree distributions, this makes a minimal difference in the model.
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Figure 3. log-log Degree Distribution
among those vertices. We view this as behavior consistent with lateral movement scenario where an attacker
is exploring the network by moving from machine to machine. They may backtrack and try different routes
(thus a tree rather than just a path) as needed.
For each of these 420 scenarios (two different degree distributions, two different anomaly types, five
different anomaly sizes, and 21 different values of α) we produce 1,000 different pairs of graphs (G,G′) where
G is a random instance of the Chung-Lu model with the chosen degree distribution and G′ is formed from
G by performing one step of the HLM evolution with the chosen parameter α, and then adding a random
instance of the chosen anomaly of the chosen size. In this way, the anomaly occurs concurrently with the
natural evolution of the network, as might be typical of real-world data. For each of our 420 scenarios,
and 1,000 pairs of graphs within the scenario, we compute the RH distance between G and G′ to get a
distribution of RH distances for the anomalous transition.
4.3. Anomalous versus Nominal Relative Hausdorff Distance. In this section we consider whether
the anomalous transitions in the HLM model result in a different distribution of RH distances than a
nominal transition. To this end, for each degree distribution and choice of α, we simulate 10,000 different
HLM transitions to develop a baseline distribution of RH distances, see Figure 4. For each of the 420
anomalous scenarios we calculate the 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-value [51] between the previously
calculated anomalous distribution and this baseline distribution. For each of the 420 different anomaly
scenarios the KS test significance value is less that 0.01, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis
that the distribution of RH distances for an anomalous HLM transition is the same as the distribution for
non-anomalous transitions. In particular, this means that in a statistical sense the RH distance is able to
pick up on anomalous evolution of the degree distribution, even when the anomaly only consists of 10 edges.6
In the next subsection we will consider the effectiveness of the RH distance in detecting anomalous behavior
directly, rather than statistically.
4.4. Anomaly Detection. In this section we consider how RH distance could be used to detect anomalous
behavior in a streaming environment and compare to the performance with a similarly lightweight measure
(KS distance) as well as a “ideal” measure (graph edit distance). To compare between these three methods
in a non-parametric way (i.e. without introducing a “anomaly threshold”) we introduce the idea of an
anomaly score of an observation with respect to a theoretically or empirically observed baseline distribution.
6It is important to note that this is not always the case. For example, in an experiment that is not reported for space
limitations, we synthetically generated a degree distribution with a power-law exponent of 4 and average degree around 1.4,
the anomalies resulted in a range of KS statistics including several scenarios which were not statistically distinguishable.
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Figure 4. Distribution of RH distance under HLM evolution
Specifically, let the random variable Z have theoretical or empirical cumulative distribution function fZ : R→
[0, 1]. We will then say that a particular observation z (not necessarily distributed as Z) has an anomaly
score relative to fZ of 2
∣∣fZ(z)− 12 ∣∣. Note that this score takes on values from [0, 1] with values closer to
one being more “anomalous.” This score can be thought of as measuring the deviation of the observation z
from the bulk of the distribution of Z.
Before turning to a direct comparison between anomaly scores for RH distance, KS p-values7, and edit
distance, we consider the performance of each of these anomaly scores in isolation via ROC-like curves,
presented for a subset of our 20 scenarios (2 distributions, 2 anomaly types, 5 levels of each anomaly) in
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8. Note that as the relative frequency of anomalous and non-anomalous behavior is
unknown, these are not truly ROC curves but rather implicit plots (x(t), y(t)) where t is some threshold
value. Specifically, y(t) is the fraction of the anomalous transitions that have anomaly score at least t, i.e.
“true positives”, where x(t) is the fraction of non-anomalous transitions that have anomaly score at least
t, i.e. “false positives”. At this point it is worth pointing out that if z is identically distributed with the
random variable Z, then the anomaly score for z is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. As a consequence,
we can explicitly define x(t) = 1 − t. To compute the ROC curve for one scenario we used the previously
computed cumulative distribution function for the 10,000 non-anomalous transitions as fZ . Then, for each
of the 1,000 anomalous transitions we use the RH distance as z and compute the anomaly score for that
value in the context of fZ .
Overall we can see that, for detecting anomalies, edit distance would be preferred to RH distance, which
would in turn be preferred to the KS statistic. However, for the bump power-law, under the lateral movement
anomaly with 10 edges, we see that the RH distance outperforms the edit distance, see Figure 7.
4.4.1. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS). For this section we will compare the anomaly score of the RH distance
with the anomaly score of the KS p-value (significance value) between successive degree distributions both for
the 420 anomalous scenarios and the 40 baseline distributions. We note that since the degree distributions
are discrete valued, the application of the KS test for hypothesis testing is not necessarily appropriate,
however as we are interested in statistical behavior of the significance test and KS is widely used in the
network analysis literature (see, for instance, [6, 11, 45]) we will ignore these technical issues.
Figure 9 gives the relative performance of the KS and RH anomaly scores across all 420 anomaly scenarios.
The y value counts how many of the 1,000 cases RH outperforms KS. We can see that the RH distance
outperforms KS the most for the scenario where there is a 50-edge scan anomaly on the power-law distribution
7From this point on in this work, although we will be using the KS p-value we will be treating it simply as a distance measure
rather than a statistical quantity. In particular, we will make no assumptions about the meaning of large or small values of the
p-value other than as a means of measuring the “closeness” between two degree distributions.
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Figure 5. Power-Law Distribution, Scan, 10 edges
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Figure 6. Power-Law, Lateral Movement, 50 edges
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Figure 7. Bump Power-Law, Lateral Movement, 10 edges
with an evolution rate of 0.23. In this case, the RH anomaly score is larger in 924 of the 1,000 different trials.
We see that overall, excepting cases with a low-evolution rate and larger, lateral movement anomalies, RH
distance is clearly superior, especially for the power-law degree distribution. It is worth noting that relative
performance of the KS statistic improves when considering the lateral movement anomaly rather than the
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Figure 8. Bump Power-Law, Scan, 50 edges
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Figure 9. Relative Performance of RH and KS Anomaly Scores
scan anomaly. Since the degree change caused by lateral movement is spread across many vertices (as
opposed to scan where the primary change is spread across only three vertices), this result can be explained
by the well known sensitivity of the KS test to variation away from the a tails of the distribution [45].
We note that a direct binary comparison between the two measures may not tell the whole story of their
relative performance. For instance, in an extreme case, one can imagine one of the two measures taking on
a fixed large value (indicating an anomaly) while the other takes on both small values and, more frequently,
a value that is slightly larger than the other anomaly score. We separate the anomalous pairs of graphs into
two sets according to whether their RH or KS anomaly score is higher. Then, for each of these two classes
we report in Figure 10 (across all 420 anomaly scenarios) the mean difference between the scores with error
bars representing one standard deviation of range around this mean. We note that the RH anomaly score
typically exceeds the KS anomaly score by about 0.4, while the KS anomaly score typically exceeds the RH
anomaly score by between 0.2 and 0.3. Further, the standard deviation across all cases the average gap
between the RH and KS anomaly score is fairly consistently in the range [0.2, 0.3] essentially independent of
all parameters. Together, the data in Figures 9 and 10, indicates that the RH distance is significantly more
sensitive than KS distance to the broad range of anomalies we have investigated.
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Figure 10. Difference between KS anomaly scores and RH anomaly scores
4.4.2. Graph Edit Distance. In this section we compare the sensitivity of RH distance to a “perfect infor-
mation” aggregate measure, in particular graph edit distance. Recall that the edit distance between two
graphs F and G is the minimum “weight” of a sequence of edge/vertex additions/deletions needed to trans-
form F to G. In general this quantity is NP-complete to compute (see [55]) and likely impractical to even
approximate [35]. This complexity is driven by the difficulty in finding the optimal alignment between the
vertices of F and G which maximizes the edge overlap between F and G. For the HLM model, this problem
is mitigated by the natural alignment between the graphs generated at consecutive time steps. Thus, for
purposes of this section we will approximate the graph edit distance as the number of edges that “flip”
during each evolution of the HLM model.
The following lemma allows us to significantly simplify the calculation of the anomaly score for edit
distance by approximating the baseline distribution with the large n limit.
Lemma 1. Let G be an random graph distributed according to G(P ) and let G′ be the graph formed by one
iteration of the Hagberg-Lemons-Mishra evolution with evolution parameter α and probability matrix P ′. Let
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X be the random variable that counts the number of edges that differ between G and G′. If Var(X) → ∞,
then X is asymptotically normally distributed.
Proof. Let Xij be the indicator function for the random variable that edge {i, j} is present in precisely one
of G′ and G and observe that X =
∑
i<j Xij . We recall that by the Lyapunov Central Limit Theorem [8, p.
362], we have that
X − E[X]√
Var(X)
D−→ N (0, 1)
if there is some δ > 0 such that
lim
n→∞
1
Var(X)
2+δ/2
∑
i<j
E
[
|Xij − E[Xij ]|2+δ
]
= 0.
Fixing δ = 1, we note that∑
i<j
E
[
|Xij − E[Xij ]|3
]
=
∑
i<j
E[Xij ] (1− E[Xij ])3 + (1− E[Xij ])E[Xij ]3
=
∑
i<j
E[Xij ] (1− E[Xij ])
(
E[Xij ]2 + (1− E[Xij ])2
)
≤
∑
i<j
E[Xij ] (1− E[Xij ])
= Var(X) .
Thus, if Var(X)→∞, then
lim
n→∞
1
Var(X)
3/2
∑
i<j
E
[
|Xij − E[Xij ]|3
]
= 0
and X is normally distributed. 
It is worth mentioning that this, in principle, allows for an explicit formula for the distribution of the
anomaly score for edit distance in a wide range of baseline and anomalous behaviors, namely
P(S ≤ s) = Φ
(
µ− µA
σA
+
σA
σ
Φ−1
(
s+ 1
2
))
− Φ
(
µ− µA
σA
− σA
σ
Φ−1
(
s+ 1
2
))
,
where (µ, σ) and (µA, σA) are the mean and distribution of the baseline and anomalous evolutions, respec-
tively, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. However, given
the correlated nature of the anomalies the calculation of σA is tedious, so we will empirically estimate this
distribution.
Figure 9b again presents the relative performance of the anomaly scores, this time for edit distance and RH
distance, for all 420 anomaly trials. Again the y value counts how many of the 1,000 cases RH outperforms
edit distance. We note that in the best case (bump power-law degree distribution, lateral movement anomaly,
10 edges, α = 0.24), the RH distance anomaly score is larger than the edit distance anomaly scores 646 times.
However, for the power-law case the RH anomaly scores essentially never outperform the edit distance
anomaly scores. This failure is mitigated by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, in many cases the edit
distance is computationally infeasible, while the RH distance requires minimal computational overhead. It
is also worth mentioning that we can see a clear degradation of performance for edit distance as the size of
the anomaly decreases and the evolution rate increases. This phenomenon can be explained by observing
that the anomaly score for edit distance is driven by a z-score of the anomaly, which is linearly correlated
with the anomaly size and inversely correlated with the standard deviation of the baseline distribution.
Additionally, the variance baseline distribution of edit distance is linear related to the evolution rate, resulting
in significantly decreased sensitivity at high evolution rates.
We further compare the relative behavior of the edit distance anomaly scores and the RH distance anomaly
scores, in the same way as we did for KS above, by considering the average difference between the anomaly
scores in the cases where the RH anomaly score is larger (positive values) and in the case the edit distance
anomaly score is larger (negative values). As the RH distance anomaly score is essentially never larger than
the edit distance anomaly score for the power-law distribution, we restrict our attention here to the bump
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Figure 11. Difference between edit distance and RH distance
power-law distribution. In Figure 11, we again report the relative magnitude of the differences with the
error bars representing an interval one standard deviation away from the mean. Again we can see a clear
stratification of the behavior with the RH anomaly scores performing better as the size of the anomaly
decreases. We also note the mild improvement in the performance of RH distance as the evolution rate
increases, likely reflecting the decreased sensitivity of edit distance (due to larger variance).
Interestingly, the standard deviation is essentially constant over all choices of degree distribution, anomaly
type, anomaly size, and evolution rate and is also roughly equal to the standard deviations shown in Figure
10. Furthermore, the magnitude of the standard deviation is close to the minimal possible standard deviation
given by the generalization of Bhatia-Davis inequality for the variance of a bounded random variable [1]. As
the extremal distribution is given by point masses at the end points of the distribution, this indicates that
there are three essentially distinct outcomes: the RH distance anomaly score is significantly larger than the
edit distance anomaly score, the RH and edit distance anomaly scores are essentially the same, and the edit
distance anomaly score is significantly larger than the RH distance anomaly score. Furthermore, this holds
regardless of the size and nature of anomaly or evolution rate and also holds when replacing edit distance
with KS distance (for both degree distributions).
5. Conclusions
In this work, we conducted an experimental and statistical study of Relative Hausdorff distance in the
context of time-evolving sequences of graphs. Applying RH distance as an anomaly detection tool, we first
tested its detection of red team events across multiple modalities in real cyber security data. We found
evidence that RH distance values register statistical change-points at red team events, although these results
were sensitive to window length, the granularity of pairwise RH measurements, and subject to the limitations
of the data. In order to test RH distance in a more controlled and rigorous manner, we then turned our
attention to a temporal graph model inspired by cyber-data.
Using this temporal graph model to generate synthetic sequences of evolving graphs, we experimentally
tested the sensitivity of RH distance to two attack profiles. To broaden our tests scope, we considered a
multitude of parameter settings in which we varied the input degree distribution, temporal evolution rate,
and intensity of the attack signal. In its own right, RH distance performed respectably, yielding ROC curves
above the line of no-discrimination for every scenario tested. Compared with other similarity measures, RH
distance consistently outperformed another lightweight similarity measure based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov
distance, while its performance against the computationally-intensive edit distance was more mixed: while
edit distance clearly outperformed RH distance under scenarios featuring the power law degree distribution,
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RH distance was better able to detect the low-intensity lateral movement attack under the bump power law
degree distribution.
Anomaly detection generally, and even specifically in cyber security, is not amenable to a “one method
to rule them all” mentality. Indeed, there are many types of anomalies and one does not expect them
to all be caught by the same detector. It is important to recognize that our analysis does not use all of
the available information pertinent to real cyber data. Distilling a time interval of data down to a single
graph and removing all metadata is likely to introduce many false positives. It could be that a graph is
anomalous given the recent context, but the behavior is fully expected by cyber security operations analysts
(e.g. a daily backup may appear to be an exfiltration if the IP addresses involved aren’t considered). In the
other direction, if the graph does not contain the metadata that would flag an anomaly, this may similarly
introduce false negatives. By integrating metadata into our analysis, it is possible that as anomalies are
discovered, this metadata could be used to help classify them as benign and nefarious anomalies. Lastly, it
is also worth noting that our analyses considered the entire data in a given period, as opposed to an online
approach. Whether and how RH distance might be utilized in online anomaly detection frameworks remains
another open topic for future research.
Funding
PNNL is operated by Battelle for the United States Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-
76RL01830. PNNL Information Release: PNNL-SA-141621. The design of the study and all data analysis
and interpretation was done under the direction of the authors of this paper.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank our colleague Carlos Ortiz-Marrero for reviewing the manuscript.
References
[1] R. Agarwal, N. S. Barnett, P. Cerone, and S. S. Dragomir, A survey on some inequalities for expectation and
variance, Computers & Mathematics with Applications, 49 (2005), pp. 429–480.
[2] C. C. Aggarwal, Y. Zhao, and S. Y. Philip, Outlier detection in graph streams, (2011).
[3] L. Akoglu and C. Faloutsos, Event detection in time series of mobile communication graphs, in Army science conference,
2010, pp. 77–79.
[4] L. Akoglu, H. Tong, and D. Koutra, Graph based anomaly detection and description: a survey, Data Mining and
Knowledge Discovery, 29 (2014), pp. 626–688.
[5] S. Aksoy, K. Nowak, and S. Young, A linear-time algorithm and analysis of graph relative hausdorff distance, in
preprint, (2018).
[6] S. Aliakbary, J. Habibi, and A. Movaghar, Quantification and comparison of degree distributions in complex networks,
in 7’th International Symposium on Telecommunications (IST’2014), IEEE, 2014, pp. 464–469.
[7] C. Avin, M. Koucky´, and Z. Lotker, How to explore a fast-changing world (cover time of a simple random walk on
evolving graphs), in Automata, Languages and Programming, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 121–132.
[8] P. Billingsley, Probability and measure, John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
[9] V. D. Blondel, A. Gajardo, M. Heymans, P. Senellart, and P. V. Dooren, A measure of similarity between graph
vertices: Applications to synonym extraction and web searching, SIAM Review, 46 (2004), pp. 647–666.
[10] B. Bolloba´s, S. Janson, and O. Riordan, The phase transition in inhomogeneous random graphs, Random Structures
and Algorithms, 31 (2007), pp. 3–122.
[11] A. D. Broido and A. Clauset, Scale-free networks are rare, arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.03400, (2018).
[12] P. Chen, S. Choudhury, and A. O. Hero, Multi-centrality graph spectral decompositions and their application to cyber
intrusion detection, in 2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), March
2016, pp. 4553–4557.
[13] F. Chung and L. Lu, The average distances in random graphs with given expected degrees, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 99 (2002), pp. 15879–15882.
[14] , The average distance in a random graph with given expected degrees, Internet Mathematics, 1 (2004), pp. 91–113.
[15] , Complex graphs and networks, vol. 107 of CBMS Regional Conference Series in Mathematics, Published for the
Conference Board of the Mathematical Sciences, Washington, DC, 2006.
[16] A. Clementi, R. Silvestri, and L. Trevisan, Information spreading in dynamic graphs, Distributed Computing, 28
(2014), pp. 55–73.
[17] A. E. F. Clementi, C. Macci, A. Monti, F. Pasquale, and R. Silvestri, Flooding time of edge-markovian evolving
graphs, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 24 (2010), pp. 1694–1712.
[18] M.-L. Ferna´ndez and G. Valiente, A graph distance metric combining maximum common subgraph and minimum
common supergraph, Pattern Recognition Letters, 22 (2001), pp. 753–758.
18
[19] J. Franc¸ois, S. Wang, T. Engel, et al., Bottrack: tracking botnets using netflow and pagerank, in International Con-
ference on Research in Networking, Springer, 2011, pp. 1–14.
[20] X. Gao, B. Xiao, D. Tao, and X. Li, A survey of graph edit distance, Pattern Analysis and Applications, 13 (2009),
pp. 113–129.
[21] M. E. Gaston, M. Kraetzl, and W. D. Wallis, Using graph diameter for change detection in dynamic networks,
Australasian J. Combinatorics, 35 (2006), pp. 299–312.
[22] J. Giuseppe, V. Roberto, and F. Cesare, An introduction to spectral distances in networks, Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications, 226 (2011), pp. 227–234.
[23] R. Gove and L. Deason, Visualizing automatically detected periodic network activity, in Proceedings of the IEEE Sym-
posium on Visualization for Cyber Security, 2018.
[24] A. Hagberg, N. Lemons, and S. Misra, Temporal reachability in dynamic networks, in Dynamic Networks and Cyber-
Security, WORLD SCIENTIFIC (EUROPE), mar 2016, pp. 181–208.
[25] F. Hausdorff, Grundzuge der Mengenlehre, American Mathematical Society, 1914.
[26] P. Holme and J. Saramki, Temporal networks, Physics Reports, 519 (2012), pp. 97–125.
[27] N. Hubballi and D. Goyal, Flowsummary: Summarizing network flows for communication periodicity detection, in
International Conference on Pattern Recognition and Machine Intelligence, Springer, 2013, pp. 695–700.
[28] K. Ishibashi, T. Kondoh, S. Harada, T. Mori, R. Kawahara, and S. Asano, Detecting anomalous traffic using
communication graphs, in Telecommunications: The Infrastructure for the 21st Century (WTC), 2010, VDE, 2010, pp. 1–
6.
[29] A. Kent, Anonymized user-computer authentication associations in time, tech. rep., Los Alamos National Lab.(LANL),
Los Alamos, NM (United States), 2014.
[30] A. D. Kent, Comprehensive, Multi-Source Cyber-Security Events. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2015.
[31] , Cybersecurity Data Sources for Dynamic Network Research, in Dynamic Networks in Cybersecurity, Imperial
College Press, June 2015.
[32] A. D. Kent, Cyber security data sources for dynamic network research, in Dynamic Networks and Cyber-Security, World
Scientific, 2016, pp. 37–65.
[33] J. M. Kleinberg, Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment, Journal of the ACM, 46 (1999), pp. 604–632.
[34] J. Leskovec, D. Chakrabarti, J. Kleinberg, and C. Faloutsos, Realistic, mathematically tractable graph genera-
tion and evolution, using kronecker multiplication, in Knowledge Discovery in Databases: PKDD 2005, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 133–145.
[35] C. L. Lin, Hardness of approximating graph transformation problem, in Algorithms and Computation, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 1994, pp. 74–82.
[36] M. Mahdian and Y. Xu, Stochastic kronecker graphs, in International workshop on algorithms and models for the web-
graph, Springer, 2007, pp. 179–186.
[37] K. M. Matulef, Final report: Sampling-based algorithms for estimating structure in big data., tech. rep., Sandia National
Laboratory, Livermore, feb 2017.
[38] A. Y. Ng, M. I. Jordan, and Y. Weiss, On spectral clustering: Analysis and an algorithm, in Advances in neural
information processing systems, 2002, pp. 849–856.
[39] J. Noble and N. Adams, Real-time dynamic network anomaly detection, IEEE Intelligent Systems, 33 (2018), pp. 5–18.
[40] M. Price-Williams, N. Heard, and M. Turcotte, Detecting periodic subsequences in cyber security data, in 2017
European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC), Sep. 2017, pp. 84–90.
[41] S. Ranshous, S. Shen, D. Koutra, S. Harenberg, C. Faloutsos, and N. F. Samatova, Anomaly detection in dynamic
networks: a survey, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics, 7 (2015), pp. 223–247.
[42] A. Sanfeliu and K.-S. Fu, A distance measure between attributed relational graphs for pattern recognition, IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-13 (1983), pp. 353–362.
[43] A. Sapienza, A. Panisson, J. Wu, L. Gauvin, and C. Cattuto, Anomaly detection in temporal graph data: An iterative
tensor decomposition and masking approach, in International Workshop on Advanced Analytics and Learning on Temporal
Data, AALTD 2015, 2015.
[44] D. Sensarma and S. S. Sarma, A survey on different graph based anomaly detection techniques, Indian Journal of Science
and Technology, 8 (2015).
[45] O. Simpson, C. Seshadhri, and A. McGregor, Catching the head, tail, and everything in between: A streaming algorithm
for the degree distribution, in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, IEEE, nov 2015.
[46] A. Stolman and K. Matulef, HyperHeadTail, in Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on
Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining 2017 - ASONAM ’17, ACM Press, 2017.
[47] B. Sderberg, General formalism for inhomogeneous random graphs, Physical Review E, 66 (2002).
[48] H. Tong and C.-Y. Lin, Non-negative residual matrix factorization with application to graph anomaly detection, in
Proceedings of the 2011 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
apr 2011.
[49] U. von Luxburg, A tutorial on spectral clustering, Statistics and Computing, 17 (2007), pp. 395–416.
[50] J. Wang and I. C. Paschalidis, Botnet detection based on anomaly and community detection, IEEE Transactions on
Control of Network Systems, 4 (2017), pp. 392–404.
[51] I. T. Young, Proof without prejudice: use of the kolmogorov-smirnov test for the analysis of histograms from flow systems
and other sources., Journal of Histochemistry & Cytochemistry, 25 (1977), pp. 935–941.
19
[52] S. J. Young, Random dot product graphs: a flexible model for complex networks, PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology, 2008.
[53] S. J. Young and E. Scheinerman, Directed random dot product graphs, Internet Mathematics, 5 (2008), pp. 91–111.
[54] S. J. Young and E. R. Scheinerman, Random dot product graph models for social networks, in Algorithms and Models
for the Web-Graph, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 138–149.
[55] Z. Zeng, A. K. Tung, J. Wang, J. Feng, and L. Zhou, Comparing stars: On approximating graph edit distance,
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 2 (2009), pp. 25–36.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, 99352
E-mail address: sinan.aksoy@pnnl.gov, kathleen.nowak@pnnl.gov,stephen.young@pnnl.gov
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Seattle, WA, 98109
E-mail address: emilie.purvine@pnnl.gov
20
